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Abstract
This study analyses the sensitivity of public goods contributions through the lens of
psychological motives. We report the results of a public goods experiment in which
subjects were induced with the motives of care and anger through autobiographical
recall. Subjects’ preferences, beliefs, and perceptions under each motive are com-
pared with those of subjects experiencing a neutral autobiographical recall control
condition. We find, but only for those subjects with the highest comprehension of the
game, that care elicits significantly higher contributions than anger, with the control
treatment in between. This positive influence of the care motive on unconditional giv-
ing is accounted for partly by preferences for giving and partly by beliefs concerning
greater contributions by others. Anger also affects attention to own and other’s pay-
offs (measured by mouse tracking) and perceptions of the game’s incentive structure
(cooperative or competitive).
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1 Introduction
The provision of public goods is a crucially important determinant of the success of
human societies. Mitigating climate change, for example, depends on individuals’ and
nations’ willingness to limit carbon emissions at private cost for benefits which will
diffuse across borders and generations. Since public goods are subject to the free-rider
problem, successful provision of the efficient level of public goods depends on whether
people can be reliably expected to contribute to them. Much evidence suggests, how-
ever, that people’s contribution behaviour changes with their internal and external
environment. Public goods, being a social interaction of mixed incentives (i.e. oppor-
tunities for both mutual gain as well as gain at another’s expense), may elicit motives
promoting either self-interest or others’ welfare. This poses a challenge to economic
theory—are people’s preferences1 over social allocations unstable? A psychologically
grounded notion of context-dependent social preferences is that different preferences
arise from different affective states, which motivate people to pursue different goals
over others. This paper is designed to test whether two such affective states can shape
preferences through motives.
Motivation psychologists have long argued that human decisions are driven by a
number of basic underlying motives,2 which determine the objectives of behaviour.
The active motive that determines appraisal and behaviour in a situation may change,
however, as humans have access to several discrete motivation systems (Heckhausen
and Heckhausen 2006). Therefore, one can encounter identical decision situations
with different motives being relevant in the moment of choice. For example, one
might approach a tennis match with the motivation to keep up a personal winning
streak on one day (achievement; Pang 2010), the motivation to affiliate (McClelland
1967) with the other players on another and the motivation to demonstrate one’s supe-
rior status (Ridgeway 1982) on yet another day. The evidence on context-sensitive
behaviour rooted in motivation psychology challenges a core assumption of neo-
classical micro economic theory where it is assumed that preferences are stable and
coherent (Samuelson 1938; see Andreoni and Miller 2002 with regard to social alloca-
tions). Different motives reveal themselves not only in behaviour, but also in distinct
expectational, perceptual and attentional patterns that can be studied by experimental
methods (Heckhausen and Heckhausen 2006). Incidental emotions may also influ-
ence decisions by affecting reasoning processes, belief formation, and self-control
(Pham 2007). We therefore measure a wide range of choice and non-choice variables
to identify the channels through which emotions influence public goods contributions.
This paper presents an investigation into whether the induced psychological motives
of care and anger drive differential behaviour in a public goods game. The care motive
1 By preferences, we mean choice orderings over the possible payoff distributions, in the sense of Andreoni
and Miller (2002), which can be elicited by conditional contribution schedules for public goods games
(Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr, 2001).
2 A motive is a force that gives direction and energy to one’s behaviour as well as its intensity and per-
sistence (see Elliot and Covington 2001; Emmons and McAdams, 1991 McClelland 1967; Rheinberg and
Engeser 2010; Schultheiss and Strasser 2012; following Atkinson 1964). Motives are more generally held
to constitute context-sensitive dispositions, which also have a stable (e.g., trait-related) component (Mischel
and Shoda 1995; Roberts and Pomerantz 2004; Emmons and McAdams 1991; Pang 2010; Heckhausen and
Heckhausen 2006).
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is focused on supporting others, helping behaviour, protecting others from harm and the
desire to promote others’ well-being (Crocker and Canevello 2012). For this reason,
the care motive is most closely related to what economists conceive of as altruism
(see Andreoni, 1990—esp. regarding its importance to the theory of public goods).
We juxtapose the induction of care motives with an induction of anger to study how
the activation of different motives can drive behaviour in both pro- and antisocial
directions. Anger motivates antisocial behavioural tendencies (Lerner and Tiedens
2006; Berkowitz 1993) and is therefore a natural foil for care since anger is concerned
with decreasing others’ utilities. Incidental anger has been studied within economics
as an important driver for economic decision-making (Drouvelis and Grosskopf 2016;
Fessler et al. 2004; Andrade and Ariely 2009). Importantly, however, the extant studies
do not identify the channels through which this incidental emotion drives choices.
We induce care and anger motives through autobiographical recall. Participants
were asked to recall memories associated with a particular motivational quality while
subjects in a comparable control condition were asked to write about recent or typical
experiences of a neutral character. Following this, subjects made decisions in a public
goods game. Our study presents a deep investigation of how care and anger influence
behaviour in a public goods game by assessing how they affect motives (preferences),
comprehension of the game’s incentives, beliefs about the other player, perception of
the strategic form of the game, and attention to payoffs and conditional contribution
behaviour.
Different motives entail different objectives and action tendencies, and thereby
preferences. At the same time, different motives are accompanied by different expec-
tational and perceptual fingerprints of a form that we present for the care and anger
motives in Sect. 2. To examine whether different motives are responsible for context-
sensitive preferences, we elicit measures of potential confounds as well as evidence
for changes in objectives across induced motives. These include mouse tracking to
elicit subjects’ attention to different aspects of the game’s incentives (own vs. other’s
payoff), perceptions of how competitive or cooperative the game form of the public
goods game is, conditional contribution schedules that control for the belief about the
contribution of the other group member, and empirical beliefs about the behaviour of
others, and comprehension of the game’s payoffs.
It has been argued that core emotions such as anger, fear, disgust and sadness play
an important role in economic decision-making (Elster 1998; Loewenstein 2000).
Our paper speaks to the literature examining the influence of incidental emotions on
decision-making. Rick and Loewenstein (2008) define incidental emotions as affec-
tive states that subjects find themselves in when they make a decision, but which are
not connected to the payoff from the imminent decision. Incidental affective states
can also influence subsequent decisions (Kahneman et al. 1986; Andrade and Ariely
2009). Incidental affective states have been found to influence decisions about labour
effort (Oswald et al. 2015), the endowment effect (Lerner et al. 2004), and public goods
contributions (Drouvelis and Grosskopf 2016). What this previous research has mostly
not considered is that affective states such as emotions and motives influence not only
behaviour and decisions, but are also reliably connected to different forms of reasoning
and cognition (Blanchette and Richards 2010) as well as different expectational and
perceptual patterns. Moreover, theorizing and empirical studies in economics alike
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have to a large extent neglected insights from the field of affective and social neuro-
science (Verweij et al. 2015). Here, it is argued that emotions may be responsible for
shaping reasoning, perception and hence behaviour even though the individual is not
aware of the emotion which gives rise to non-deliberate decision-making (Damasio
1999; Panksepp 2005; LeDoux 2008; Purves 2010). In this view, emotions and social
cognition are closely interlinked and mutually dependent (Phelps et al. 2014; Inzlicht
et al. 2015).
Importantly, there exists a close interaction between emotions and motives, but it
should be noted that according to our understanding, they are not identical. In the
field of motivation research, many competing views exist on how emotion and moti-
vation are connected. Some approaches define emotions as antecedents of motivated
behaviour or cues for the activation of motivational systems (Lang and Davis 2006).
Yet others see emotions as concomitant epiphenomena (Frijda 1988), or as functionally
equivalent to motivation (for a description of the emotional core system see Levenson
1999). Our focus is on teasing out the motivational components of induced emotions,
as motives are most closely related to the economic concept of preferences. Motives
constitute the objectives of behaviour in contrast to other facets of emotions such as
physiological experiences or moods. Roseman (2011) finds that the term “emotiva-
tional goals” is used among some researchers to focus on the motivational component
of many emotions (see also Sect. 2). Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2006) note on
the connection between motives and emotions that emotions “navigate” motivations
since they signal to individuals how close they are to achieving their goals and are
responsible for giving physiological and affective feedback as to whether their current
course of action is appropriate for reaching those goals.
Our results suggest that comprehension of the game’s strategic incentives is het-
erogeneous, and that comprehension level moderates the effect of induced motives
on contributions. In contrast to Fosgaard et al. (2014), we find that subjects with the
highest comprehension levels respond in the hypothesized directions, whereas sub-
jects with imperfect comprehension of the game show no or very weak responses to
the treatment; that is subjects motivated by care contribute more than control subjects,
who contribute more than subjects motivated by anger—but only when the game is
well understood. This finding is only partially mediated by descriptive beliefs. We do
not find that subject comprehension differs across treatments.
Furthermore, among our high-comprehension subsample, subjects’ conditional
contribution schedules (i.e. contributions conditional on beliefs about contributions of
others, per Fischbacher et al. 2001) differ significantly by motivational state. Regres-
sion analysis shows that the care motive leads to a significantly higher contribution
conditional on another’s contribution than the control condition. Moreover, we find
significant differences in the share of conditional contribution types between treat-
ments: subjects motivated by care are significantly more likely to be categorized as
“conditional contributors” compared to subjects motivated by anger, with the share
of conditional contributors in the control condition lying between these two. We also
find that care leads to significantly fewer “hump-shaped” strategy profiles compared
with the control condition.
Finally, we find suggestive evidence that subjects’ perceptions and attention to the
game’s payoffs vary across motivational condition. In particular, angry subjects tend
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to perceive the public goods game as having a competitive nature (perceived strategic
substitutability) around twice as often compared to caring and control subjects. Angry
subjects also pay the most attention to their other group member’s payoff from the
game. Taken together, the results for behaviour, perceptions and attention under anger
give evidence for the motivational fingerprint that is characteristic of the anger motive.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the relevant literatures
in experimental economics and motivation psychology; Sect. 3 lays out the design of
our experiment; Sect. 4 states our hypotheses; Sect. 5 presents our results and Sect. 6
provides a concluding discussion.
2 Background
2.1 Related literature
Our work is most closely related to other studies within economics that examine the
role of incidental emotions in economic decision-making with a special emphasis
on public goods. We add to the previous literature by examining the role of motives
for economic decision-making which includes an identification of the specific moti-
vational fingerprint in the public goods game context as well as an account of the
relationship between motives and game comprehension.
The impact of emotions on economic decision-making has been investigated in a
number of studies (e.g. Polman and Kim 2013; see Rick and Loewenstein 2008; or
Lerner et al. 2015, for extensive reviews). Emotions manifest concomitant motives; for
example, the drive to achieve something can stem from the desire to experience success
and avoid feelings of failure (Covington 2000). The reverse is also true: the feelings
experienced surrounding a failure can motivate individuals to change behaviour to
avoid these feelings in the future. Motives thus constitute the goal-oriented compo-
nent of many emotions, which are not simply a cluster of subjective/physiological
experiences, but something that can causally direct behaviours towards certain ends.
Roseman (2011) finds that several authors speak of “emotivational goals” to highlight
this motivational component of many emotions.
Public goods games have been studied extensively in the experimental economics
literature (see Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2011 for reviews). A number
of investigators highlight that cooperation in the provision of public goods is highly
sensitive to the environmental context (Cartwright 2016; Fosgaard et al. 2014, 2017).
Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2016) suggest that one of these influences may be affective
states, by studying the impact of induced anger and happiness on voluntary contri-
butions to a linear public good. They find that angry subjects contribute significantly
less than happy subjects and punish harsher than happy subjects when they control
for deviations from own contributions. Our study extends this line of inquiry in sev-
eral directions. Whereas Drouvelis and Grosskopf do not explore the consequences
of varying comprehension and perception for their results, we are able to disentangle
the interactions between the affective states and their influence on understanding of
the incentives of the game, separate out their effects on beliefs and preferences, and
document their effect on perceptual and attentional tendencies. By doing so, we shed
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light on the channels through which cooperative behaviour in the public goods game
emerges from two induced affective states. We also choose to target the induction of
different motivational states particularly, rather than just moods, as motives share a
conceptual affinity with the economic notion of preferences.
Joffily et al. (2014) measure how free riding and punishment in the game affect
emotions endogenously using skin conductance. Angry subjects punish free-riders,
and those with the strongest emotional response to punishment increase their contri-
butions in turn. Both Dickinson and Masclet (2015, in a public goods setting) as well
as Stang et al. (2016, for dictator games) find that subjects who have been treated
unfairly respond with less negative reciprocity when given another outlet to express
their anger.
Some authors nevertheless suggest that variability in cooperation across different
environments arises from shifts in subject comprehension of the game’s incentives.
Fosgaard et al. (2014, 2017) find that contribution strategies do not significantly differ
across frames after excluding subjects who could not identify the selfish best-response
and the social welfare maximizing strategies in a comprehension quiz; though Gächter,
Kölle and Quercia (2016) find framing effects which are robust to controlling for sub-
ject comprehension. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2008) argue that different environments could
lead to different behaviour because: (i) different environments are associated with dif-
ferent preferences and hence motivate context-specific choices; or (ii) preferences
do not depend on environmental context, but environmental cues motivate people in
ways which might make it more difficult to implement their true stable preferences.
To the extent that the activation of a certain motivational state may lead individuals
to analogize the public goods game to an inappropriate real-life counterpart, poten-
tial treatment differences might be explained by this apparent confusion. The public
goods literature has devoted some attention to the question of whether giving can
be explained through misconception of the game’s incentives (Houser and Kurzban
2002; Bayer et al. 2009; Ferraro and Vossler 2010; Burton-Chellew et al. 2016). We
seek to clarify whether context-sensitive motives might influence public goods game
giving through this channel. We, therefore, analyse the behaviour of those subjects
in our experiment who demonstrated perfect comprehension of the game’s incentives
in addition to the full sample. This comprehension check was performed after the
autobiographical recall inductions.
The present study speaks to the literature that investigates how different frames and
primes affect contributions to public goods. Drouvelis et al. (2015) find that priming
the concept of cooperation in a public goods game increases contributions to the public
good. A number of studies have documented that “giving” to provide a public good
elicits more cooperation than “taking” from a commonly shared resource, even when
the payoff structure is equivalent (most prominently Andreoni 1995). Labels attributed
to the game (i.e., calling the same game differently, such as the “wall-street” vs. the
“community game”) have also been argued to influence behaviour through diverse
mechanisms (Liberman et al. 2004; Eriksson and Strimling 2014; Yamagishi et al.
2013). Labels might influence choices by influencing which mental representation of
the situation is selected as a real-life resemblance of this situation (Kroneberg et al.
2010; Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006). Dufwenberg et al. (2011) collect both first-
and second-order beliefs in their label framing experiments, and find that labels impact
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beliefs, though not contributions, significantly. They also find that the same labels can
have different effects on beliefs among distinct subject pools, and argue that this is
culturally driven. Cartwright (2016) concludes in his review that:
“… framing has been shown to influence attitudes, beliefs, moral judgements, the
proportion of free-riders and misperceptions, even if the net effect on average
contributions was small, (…). The absence of a [framing] effect on average
contributions does not, therefore, mean the absence of a[n] effect.”
2.2 The fingerprint of preferences under care: action tendencies, beliefs,
perception and attention under the caremotive
The motive we refer to here as care has been referred to by H. Heckhausen as “help”
(1989) and J. Heckhausen as “prosocial altruism” (2000) and finally as “compassion”
(Goetz et al. 2010; Condon and Feldman Barrett 2013; Crocker and Canevello 2012).
This motive has recently been investigated by experimental economists (Bault et al.
2017; Chierchia et al. 2017; Ring et al. 2018).3 Care is closely related to the economic
conception of altruism (Andreoni, 1990; based on, e.g., Edgeworth 1881) in which the
well-being of other people enters one’s own utility positively. While this formulation
is parsimonious and useful to describe the prosocial behavioural component of care,
abundant evidence in psychology finds that the care motive further has an important
impact on beliefs, perceptions and attentional patterns. The main behavioural tendency
of the Care motive is to help and to become active in improving the well-being of others.
(Goetz et al. 2010; Condon and Feldman Barrett 2013). Batson and Shaw (1991) show
that care motivates altruistic behaviour towards those in need at the cost to the self.
We, therefore, expect higher contributions conditional on hypothetical contributions
of the other group member in the public goods game as well as higher unconditional
contributions compared to anger-motivated subjects and those in the control condition.
Also, care-motivated individuals are sensitive to deservingness of care so as not to be
exploited by free-riders (Goetz et al. 2010). Thus, we expect that subjects under care
motives will conditionally contribute higher amounts particularly in these cases, when
the other group member has contributed significant amounts.
Since care leads people to create environments in which cooperation flourishes,
these actions increase their beliefs that others in this environment will be cooperative
as well (Crocker and Canevello 2012).
The care motive is associated with a high attention to others’ wellbeing. Care-
motivated individuals show a reduced cognitive focus on their own needs relative to
others’ (Batson et al. 1983, 1987). We hypothesize that subjects under the care motive
display less attentional focus on own payoff and pay increased attention to the payoff
of their group member compared to control and anger-motivated subjects.
Furthermore, care-motivated individuals feel cooperative with others and seek
possibilities to fulfil their needs through cooperation with other people. They feel
responsible for others and view themselves as an origin of others’ well-being (Crocker
and Canevello 2012). Therefore, care-motivated individuals perceive desired outcomes
3 To the best of our knowledge, the first version of this manuscript from July 2016 was the first study that
experimentally assessed the implications of the care motive in economics.
123
S. Bartke et al.
as having a nonzero-sum or win–win quality. In terms of perceptual tendencies, we
hypothesize that subjects under the influence of the motive to care perceive the form
of the public goods game to be a game of cooperation.
2.3 The fingerprint of preferences under anger: action tendencies, beliefs,
perception and attention under the anger motive
The anger motive has been characterized by H. Heckhausen as “aggression” (1989),
by McDougall (1932) and Panskepp as “rage” (2006), and by Reiss (2004) as
“vengeance”. Anger leads to antisocial behavioural tendencies such as aggression
(Lerner and Tiedens 2006; Berkowitz 1993), reduced helping behaviour (Rudolph
et al. 2004) and antisocial welfare decisions (Small and Lerner 2008). We therefore
expect anger-motivated subjects to conditionally and unconditionally contribute less
to the public good than subjects under care and control.
The anger motive is associated with the corresponding emotional state of anger
(Ekman 1992; Novaco and Taylor 2000; Averill 1982). Of special interest to our study
is that anger is associated with a high infusive potential: the affective state carries over
from past anger-evoking events to unrelated situations, and influences judgements and
decisions in these new situations (Lerner and Tiedens 2006). Individuals motivated by
anger do not discriminate between recipients in their punitive reactions (Lerner et al.
1998). Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) use self-reports to argue that small offers in the
ultimatum game are rejected because they make receivers angry, a finding for which
Sanfey et al. (2003) found evidence in an fMRI study.
In terms of attention, when people are primed to associate an object with anger
they are more likely to desire this object (Aarts et al. 2010). Also, the anger motive
has been associated with the apperception of injustice (Smith and Lazarus 1990).
Finucane (2011) finds that anger increases selective attention generally. Hence, it can
be expected that anger drives subjects to be especially attentive of payoff differences in
their disfavour. Thus, anger has consequences for attentional foci which are directed
towards positional concerns as well as how neutral environments are perceived: as
stages in which competition occurs. Moreover, Van Kleef et al. (2008) conclude that
the anger motive tends to motivate individuals to pursue more competitive behaviour.
The anger motive has also been found to influence beliefs. Anger leads people to
believe that they will get what they want (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003;
Lerner and Keltner 2000). In combination with the previous insights, we therefore
expect that anger-motivated subjects contribute little themselves with the desire to
have a greater payoff from the social dilemma situation than their other group member
which implies that they should expect higher contributions from their group member.
In conclusion, the anger motive elicits behaviour, perceptions and beliefs that are
associated with a clear antisocial direction in a social dilemma, which makes it an ideal
candidate to be juxtaposed with the care motive to study the implications of motives
in this context.
123
Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with…
Fig. 1 Sequence of the experiment
3 Experimental design
Subjects made contribution decisions in a linear one-shot public goods game in groups
of two participants. Subjects were informed that they would never learn about the
identity of their other group member. The payoff structure was symmetric and entailed
a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 0.75. Each subject i was endowed with e10
of which they had to decide how much ci ∈ {0, . . . , 10} in whole Euro amounts to
contribute to the public good. The monetary payoff for subject i was
πi  10 − ci + 0.75 × (ci + c j ), (1)
where ci is subject i’s contribution to the public good and c j is the contribution of i’s
other group member j to the public good.
Each session of our experiment consisted of two parts which were run back-to-
back. First, a motive induction part induced the motives of care or anger (or did not
induce a motive in the case of the control treatment). The second, decision-making
part, followed directly after the motive induction. In this second part, subjects viewed
example calculations and answered comprehension questions, made unconditional and
conditional contribution decisions, stated their beliefs and norms about contributions
and stated their impressions of the game under the influence of the just-induced motive.
Figure 1 depicts the sequence in the experiment.
We implemented several procedural design features intended to reduce potential
experimenter demand effects (EDEs) using non-deceptive obfuscation (as suggested
by Zizzo 2010). Different experimenters administered each part of the session and were
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only in the lab for the duration of their respective part.4 The experimenter administering
the second part of the session was blind to the motive induction conducted in the first
part. Subjects were also recruited separately for each part: only subjects who had
already signed up for the first part were invited to the second. The recruitment email
for the second part was sent from a different researcher,5 and stated that a session
would take place directly after the one that they had already signed up for. Subjects
were not required to participate in both parts of the session.6 Subjects who wished
to participate only in the first part left the lab with the experimenter and were paid
for their participation. We therefore collected no choice data from these subjects.
Likewise, some subjects who signed up for the first part but were sent away because
they showed up late were allowed to participate in the second part if free places were
available. We do not report data from these subjects. Around 90% of the subjects
that took part in the first part of the session stayed in the lab for the second part. No
deception was used at any point in our experiment.
3.1 The autobiographical recall method
In the first session, motives were induced through an autobiographical recall technique
in which subjects wrote essays about personal experiences relevant to the respective
motive that was induced (Frijda et al. 1989, Mauro et al. 1992). This technique has
been used in the experimental economics literature (Capra 2004; Capra et al. 2010;
Lin et al. 2006; Kausel and Connolly 2014; Elliott et al. 1998; Derbaix and Vanhamme
2003; see also: Rand et al. 2012) and has been found effective to induce different states
according to meta-analyses (Westermann et al. 1996; Lench et al. 2011). Subjects were
paid a fixed amount ofe4.50 for the motivation induction session, which lasted around
30 min.
There is strong evidence that emotions have the ability to focus one’s cognition
not only towards what initially led to the feeling of the affective state but also to
unrelated events. This finding is called the carryover of incidental emotion (Lerner
and Tiedens 2006; Bodenhausen 1993; Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). We also know
that the effects of emotions can drive choices when the decision environment contains
real monetary incentives (Lerner et al. 2004) and even in the presence of incentives to
disregard irrelevant influences.
Instructions (see supplementary materials) for the autobiographical recall induction
were distributed to the participants and read out loud by the experimenter. For all three
treatments of the autobiographical recall parts of the session, subjects were instructed
to write a total of two personal essays about own past experiences. The topics of the
experiences that subjects were asked to recall were selected to represent particular
aspects of the target motive we sought to induce. Only one subject from our sample
4 The two-part design has been used by, e.g., Elliott, Hayward, and Canon (1998) to mitigate against
experimenter demand effects.
5 Both are co-authors on this manuscript.
6 To make this credible a show-up payment was advertised for the first part.
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refused to write such personal essays.7 After the instructions for each essay were read
out, the experimenter read out a corresponding example essay to the subjects meant
to exemplify the length and depth of such an essay.8 This took approximately 3 min.
After the example essay was read out, subjects were told to imagine their personal
memory as vividly as possible for 2 min. After this reflection time, subjects wrote
down their personal essay for 8 min. Subjects completed this procedure twice, with
two different topics per motive induction treatment. For the care motive induction,
the two topics were: (1) a situation in which subjects either helped or thought about
helping another person even though this person may not have expected to be helped
and (2) a situation in which subjects felt compassion and feelings of warmth for
another person as well as the motivation to improve that other person’s wellbeing.
In the induction for the anger motive the topics were: (1) a situation that frustrated
the subject but where the subject was not responsible for the cause of the frustration
and (2) a situation of verbal harassment or insult. In the control condition, subjects
were asked to recall (1) the course of a typical day in their lives and (2) a description
of what they did yesterday. Previous findings in the motivation psychology literature
suggest that dangerous stimuli such as harassment (Berkowitz and LePage 1967) as
well as situations leading to frustration (Kornadt 1984, Herrero et al. 2010) represent
threats to physical or psychological integrity that can elicit angry responses. The
autobiographical recall topics for the care motive induction follow precisely from the
stated definition and insights about compassionate states above.
3.2 Manipulation validation
Prior to the main experiment, we validated the autobiographical recall procedure
described above. This was done in a separate set of pilot sessions which used the
procedures described in the previous subsection. In this manipulation check pilot,
subjects first participated in one of the treatments of the autobiographical recall pro-
cedure. Subsequently, subjects took part in a questionnaire probing their feelings and
motivational states. In particular, subjects indicated with a mark on a continuous scale
ranging from “not at all” on the one side to “very much” on the other, “to which degree
they feel like one of the following motivations and emotions in this very moment”.
Each subject provided such ratings for 22 adjectives, which comprised words related
7 This subject received a show-up fee outside of the experimental room and subsequently left. We are
therefore confident that selection into treatments is not an issue in our sample.
8 Translated versions of the example essays can be found in the supplementary materials. The main purpose
of the example essays was to increase the willingness in subjects to write down a personal memory that
is emotionally engaged. We read every essay carefully and find little similarity patterns across essays and
with example essays except for the control condition. Our subject sample consists of students from Kiel
University. The example frustration essay treated a job-life-related situation, whereas most subjects wrote
about a situation in their student life that frustrated them. The goal of our study is to study motives, ensuring
a design that actually activates motives is crucial to our research question. In terms of the insult essay, most
subjects did not write about harassment due to a handicap, but disputes when going out, competing at sports
or driving on the road. Together with the essays about “situations in which you felt feelings of compassion
and warmth for another person”, the insult and harassment essays yielded the broadest heterogeneity in
terms of content subjects wrote about. Interestingly, most helping essays did not circle around an experience
that was located at university, but involved persons that our subjects were privately acquainted with like
neighbours, friends or team members.
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to several motives, such as anger (five words), care (five), fear (five), and achievement
(five), as well as the affective states of being happy and sad. These words were selected
to be maximally specific indicators for distinct motives (see Chierchia et al. 2017 for
details). A complete list of words can be obtained upon request. These ratings were
compared between the care, anger and control treatments. Achievement motives are
associated with positive valence, because of the hope of success or because of the
pride of having accomplished something (Pang 2010). We elicited words related to
the achievement motive in this manipulation check to verify that the care treatment
increased ratings on care words and not on positively valanced words in general. Like-
wise, fear motives, like anger motives, are associated with negatively valanced feelings
(Avram et al. 2010 and, therefore, ratings of fear words serve as a manipulation check
that the anger treatment did not just lead to an increased focus on negative valence.
Moreover, the anger motive induction asked subjects to recall experiences of being
harassed and insulted which might have also primed fear. Finally, we checked for the
implications of the care and anger motive inductions on positive and negative affect
in the form of happiness and sadness.
Hypothesis M.1 Subjects under the care motive induction report higher ratings on care
words than subjects under the control condition.
Hypothesis M.2 Subjects under the anger motive induction report higher ratings on
anger words than subjects under the control condition.
Data for the manipulation check were collected between September and November
2015. Subjects came from the Kiel University subject pool and studied diverse subjects.
In total 133 subjects participated in this manipulation check. The share of women in the
sample was 51%. Three of these subjects have been excluded from analysis because
they did not have a sufficient command of the German language. Of these 130 subjects,
45 participated in the control treatment, 41 in the anger induction treatment, and 44 in
the care induction treatment. We compare the mean ratings of words within specific
motivational categories between the treatments using rank sum tests. We find that the
care motive induction treatment increases self-reported ratings of care words compared
to control at p 0.003. We also find that the anger treatment increases self-reported
ratings on anger words compared to control at p < 0.001. While care-related words are
rated slightly lower under anger than under the control treatment, this difference is not
significant (p > 0.35). Anger-related words are rated almost exactly similarly in the care
and control conditions (p > 0.72). Relative to these ratings under the control condition,
both care and anger decrease ratings on achievement motive words. While this effect
of the anger treatment is with p=0.074 only marginally significant, it is with p=0.006
significant under the care motive induction. Achievement ratings under care and anger
are not significantly different (p > 0.60). Fear-related words are not rated significantly
differently across treatments. The affective states of happiness and sadness are also
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Table 1 Results of manipulation check sessions—differences in mean ratings over motive-specific words
after autobiographical recall motive induction
Treatment Anger Control Care
Observations 41 45 44
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
Anger words 0 10 3.01*** 0 8.49 1.55 0 8.78 1.58
SE 0.34 0.25 0.22
Care words 0 10 4.24 0 10 4.71 0 10 6.04***
SE 0.32 0.34 0.32
Significantly different from respective mean rating under control (***p < 0.01)
largely unaffected by our motive induction treatments9. We take this as evidence that
later results obtained after the care motive induction are not driven by mood changes.
Table 1 presents an overview of the data and results from the manipulation check.
Table 1 shows robust standard errors clustered at the individual subject level in
parentheses. This table describes mean self-reported subject ratings over words that
represent care and anger motives. Subjects indicated how much they felt like each of
several motive-specific words following the autobiographical recall induction. Ratings
were made on a continuous scale from “not at all” (0) to “very much” (10).
We, therefore, find evidence for the two hypotheses of the manipulation check
sessions: Our autobiographical recall procedure successfully activates anger and care
motives.
3.3 Design details of decision-making session
In our experiment, subjects make a one-shot contribution decision because we are
interested in how the motive inductions affect subjects’ choices in the absence of
learning effects, strategic considerations, and reputational concerns. Subjects are also
asked to complete four comprehension questions involving payoff calculations about
the game. We investigate whether the induced motives lead to differences in the com-
prehension of the incentives of the public goods game (per Fosgaard et al. 2014). If
a subject cannot correctly compute payoff outcomes, it is very likely that this subject
has not understood the game. Making correct inferences about the motivation behind
observed behaviour is problematic as recently pointed out and investigated by Cason
and Plott (2014). At the beginning of the decision session, the experimenter distributes
the instructions and reads them out loud. The first explicit decision task is the contri-
bution decision to the public good. However, before subjects enter their unconditional
contribution decision we implicitly collect data on how subjects’ attention to their
own and their other group members’ hypothetical payoffs vary between treatments.
9 The care motive induction, however, slightly increases ratings of sadness. This is unsurprising, given that
previous studies have established that compassion and unpleasant feelings can often co-occur (e.g., when
viewing others suffer, Condon and Feldman Barrett 2013).
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In particular, we randomly generate example contributions and record how often sub-
jects look at the resulting payoffs to themselves vs. the resulting payoffs to their other
group member using a mouse tracking interface within z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
Concretely, we present them with two randomly generated examples showing their
own payoff and their partner’s payoff in two boxes onscreen. For these two examples,
the resulting payoffs from the example contributions only become visible to the sub-
jects if they hover over the respective boxes with the mouse and only for as long as
the mouse arrow is over the box.
Directly after these two mouse-over example screens, subjects decide how much
to contribute to the public good. Once subjects enter this unconditional contribution
decision, we ask subjects whether they perceive the decision environment of the public
goods game as either a cooperative or a competitive context. This elicitation seeks to
investigate whether the motivational inductions affect the way subjects spontaneously
frame the game. Similar to Zizzo and Tan (2007), subjects are asked to indicate in a
binary choice whether they perceive the public goods game to be more similar to a
purely cooperative game that provides strategic complementarity (a pure coordination
game) or to a purely competitive game with substitutability in strategies (matching
pennies).10 This decision is not incentivized.
Subsequently, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about their other group member’s contri-
bution to the public good. These are incentivized as in Gächter and Renner (2010).
Subjects are asked how many euros they think their other group member has previously
put into the group account. If a subject guesses the other’s contribution correctly, she
earns an additional 1 euro. Incorrect guesses are not rewarded. Following the belief
elicitation, the amount that subjects think that both they and their other group member
should have contributed (contribution norm) is elicited using a similar mechanism
adapted from Krupka and Weber (2013).
After this elicitation of contribution norms, the experiment continues by eliciting
subjects’ conditional contribution schedules. Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we
ask subjects how they would change their contribution if they knew how much their
other group member had contributed. Without knowing how much their other group
member actually contributed, subjects fill in a contribution table in a strategy method
design (Selten 1967). Subjects indicate for each of the 11 possible contributions that
their other group member could have made how much they would want to contribute in
response. This measures one’s preferences for contributing to the public good because
it specifies the desired contribution for each possible information set. Subjects have
an incentive to state their true preferences in the conditional contribution schedule,
because for one randomly selected subject within each group the conditional con-
tribution decisions are carried out to determine the final payoff and not the initial
contribution decision.
After subjects complete their work on these tasks, they are called one by one into
another room to receive their payment from the study privately.
10 The descriptions used may be found in the supplementary materials.
123
Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with…
4 Hypotheses
This section presents the hypotheses that we sought to test in the public goods game in
the second session of the experiment. These follow from the behavioural and perceptual
tendencies of our target motives outlined in Sect. 2 and relates them concretely to the
public goods game.
Hypothesis 1 Contributions: subjects under care contribute more to the public good
than subjects under control, while contributions under anger are lower than contri-
butions under control. This is driven in part by different preferences (conditional
contribution schedules).
We do not have concrete hypotheses regarding beliefs, and collect them for pur-
poses of control and inference. In general, it is known that subjects with pro-social
preferences also exhibit prosocial beliefs about others (Yamagishi et al. 2013). There
is evidence that this could possibly hold because subjects could self-project their own
preferences to others (Krueger et al. 2012). Caring subjects are, therefore, conjectured
to believe that their own prosocial behaviour leads others to also act pro-socially. As
we have seen in the previous section, the evidence in the case of anger points in two
directions concerning beliefs that subjects could hold. On the one hand, angry indi-
viduals may expect deference from their partners in the form of higher contributions.
On the other, subjects under anger may reasonably expect that their counterparts are
angry too and hence infer that they will not contribute much.
Hypothesis 2 Attention: both care and anger increase subjects’ attention to the others’
payoffs relative to control.
In different one-shot games, an eye-tracking study by Polonio et al. (2015) has
suggested that subjects’ social preferences can be inferred from how attentive they
are to: (i) strategies that maximize the distance between their own payoff compared
to their partner’s payoff and (ii) strategies that minimize this comparison. Since we
hypothesize that different motives entail different social preferences, we assume that
subjects motivated by care or anger could focus more on the payoffs of others, albeit
for opposite reasons, namely to respectively, increase vs. decrease the payoff of others.
Hypothesis 3 Perceptions: care subjects perceive the nature of the public goods game
as significantly more cooperative than control subjects. Subjects under anger perceive
the game as significantly more competitive than control subjects.
The public goods game is one of mixed incentives—i.e. incentives are not com-
pletely aligned since free-riding increases one’s own payoff at the expense of the
other, but incentives are not completely opposed since both players benefit from higher
mutual contribution levels. At the individual level, it depends on the subject’s belief
about the other group member’s contribution as well as the nature of the subjects’
(social) preferences how harmonious the interests in the public goods game are per-
ceived. The care motive increases one’s focus on mutually beneficial outcomes and
anger motive leads to an increase in competitive objectives.
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5 Results
Data were collected over the months of March and April 2016. Subjects came from
the University of Kiel subject pool and studied diverse subjects. The experiment was
organized and administered with the software hroot (Bock et al. 2014) and programmed
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In total 184 subjects participated in both
the motive induction and public goods parts. Of these, 57 participated in the control
treatment, 62 in the anger induction treatment, and 65 in the care induction treatment.
Subjects earned on average e18.20 combined for the two sessions, which together
lasted around 90 min.
45% of subjects were male and 55% were female. There are no significant gender
differences across the three treatments.
Comprehension of the public goods game’s payoffs was widely distributed in our
subject pool. The quiz had four questions. The mean number of incorrectly answered
questions were 0.8 in control (sd1), 0.7 in anger (sd1.1) and 0.9 in care (sd1).
According to rank sum11 tests, none of the pairwise comparisons in the number of
incorrectly answered questions produce significant differences between treatments. It
should also be noted that none of the distributions over shares of subjects who made a
certain number of mistakes (0–4) differ in pairwise comparisons across our treatments.
Also, over all three treatments, the distribution of scores is not significantly different
(both these insights stem from Fisher’s exact tests).
However, only 97 of the 184 subjects correctly calculated payoffs on all of the
post-game comprehension questions. We have strong reasons to expect that the effect
that different motives have on choices will be observable with the least distortion for
those who fully understood the game.12 This is because motives concern the objectives
of choice. Choices made by those who did not understand the game do not convey
clear information about their objectives. For this reason, we report results for both the
full sample, as well as the subsample of participants who passed the comprehension
quiz and whose native language was German (one additional subject is excluded on
this basis). We denote this the “comprehension sample” and henceforth emphasize the
results for these subjects. Table 2 reports the averages of the main variables of interest,
broken out by treatment, for both the full and comprehension samples.
Result 1 In the comprehension sample, subjects under care contribute significantly
more than subjects under anger, with control condition subjects clearly in the mid-
dle. However, no significant differences in contributions are seen in the full sample.
Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, supported in the comprehension sample only.
Figure 2 displays the mean contribution levels across the three treatments. In the full
sample, there are no significant differences. In the comprehension sample by contrast,
contributions in the care induction treatment are over e1.50 higher than in the anger
induction treatment. This difference is significant at the p= 0.039 level according to
11 Two-sided p-values are reported throughout.
12 Appendix Table A.1 shows a regression estimating how treatment differences vary continuously across
the various levels of comprehension as measured by the number of incorrectly answered comprehension
questions. We find that as comprehension goes down, the differences across treatments progressively dimin-
ish.
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Fig. 2 Average contributions across treatments
a rank sum test. A Cuzick13 test also confirms that there is a significant ordering of
contributions by treatment in the comprehension sample, with contributions under
anger lower than those under control in turn lower than those under care (p= 0.049).
Appendix Figure A.1 shows the full histograms of contributions by treatment for both
the full and comprehension samples.
In the following, we expand on this result by documenting the induced motives’
effects on preferences, beliefs, and perceptions.
Result 2 Subjects’ preferences, as elicited by their conditional contribution schedules,
differ significantly across induced motives in the comprehension sample, and to a lesser
extent also in the full sample. The care induction treatment leads to significantly more
pro-social preferences. The anger induction treatment does not change conditional
contributions significantly.
Figure 3 plots subjects’ contribution schedules averaged across all subjects in each
treatment. The mean contribution schedules for each treatment are graphed, with the
full sample in the left panel and the comprehension sample in the right. In the full
sample, average contributions are slightly higher in the care induction than in the
control treatment at all hypothesized partner contributions, with around the same
slope. Subjects in the anger induction treatment give slightly higher than those in
the other treatment at low partner contributions and lower than those in the control
13 An extension of the rank-sum test for trends. See Cuzick (1985).
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Fig. 3 Conditional contribution schedules
or care induction treatments at higher contributions (i.e. the slope is shallower). In
the comprehension sample, care-induced subjects give the most at all hypothesized
partner contributions, followed by control subjects and then by anger-induced subjects.
Of particular note in our sample is that contribution schedules in all treatments cross
the 45-degree line, meaning that on average there is not selfish-biased conditional
cooperation14 among our subjects.
Table 3 shows the results of regressions which estimate the contribution sched-
ules using treatment dummies and interaction terms. All 11 conditional contribution
decisions made by each subject are regressed on the hypothetical partner contribu-
tion for that decision. The other’s hypothetical contribution strongly predicts greater
conditional contributions, with the slope of the estimated regression function very sig-
nificantly positive across all treatments in both the full and comprehension samples.
Since the hypothetical partner contributions are normalized by the actual mean uncon-
ditional contributions in the sample, the coefficients on anger and care represent the
difference in predicted conditional contributions at the mean of the sample. Specifi-
cally, subjects in the anger induction treatment contribute roughly e0.05 more than
control subjects on average in the full sample and roughly e0.25 more than control
subjects on average in the comprehension sample, though neither of these estimates
is significantly different from zero (p= 0.91 and p= 0.66, respectively). Subjects in
the care induction treatment contribute roughly e0.53 more than control subjects on
average in the full sample and roughly e1.03 more than control subjects on average
in the comprehension sample, with the difference statistically significant at p= 0.075
14 This phenomenon is identified by Neugebauer et al. (2009) as underlying the decline in contributions
for repeated public goods games.
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Table 3 Regression of conditional contribution on hypothesized other’s contribution
Full sample Comprehension sample
Other’s contribution 0.778*** (0.049) 0.715*** (0.079)
Anger 0.045 (0.398) 0.247 (0.565)
Care 0.530 (0.352) 1.03* (0.572)
Anger × other’s contribution − 0.157* (0.087) − 0.015 (0.106)
Care × other’s contribution 0.028 (0.069) 0.103 (0.104)
Constant 4.72 4.56
N 184 96
R2 .460 .466
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by subject. Other’s contribution is measured as deviations from
sample mean contribution such that the coefficients on anger and care may be interpreted as differences in
the height of the contribution schedules at their mean
***Indicates significance at the 1% level, whereas * indicates significance at the 10% level
in the comprehension sample though marginal (p= 0.13) in the full sample. We also
observe that contribution schedules are slightly steeper for care-induced subjects and
slightly shallower for anger-induced subjects relative to the control treatment, though
only in the full sample can we say that the contribution schedules of the anger-induced
subjects are shallower than those of the control or care-induced subjects (p= 0.071
compared with control and p= 0.033 vs. care induction).
We have also categorized each subject according to the pattern displayed in their
contribution schedule. All subjects fit exactly one of five types. The most common
type, which we denote “conditional contributor” is assigned to all subjects whose con-
tribution schedules display a significantly positive (at the 1% level) Spearman rank
correlation between own and partner’s contribution. “Free riders” give e0 across
the range of partner contributions. Similarly, “pure altruists” give some positive
amount that does not vary across the range of hypothesized partner contributions.
The second-most common type, “hump contributors,” have a contribution schedule
that is increasing up to some hypothesized partner contribution, and then decreasing
as contributions go higher. These types are known in the literature (see seminally
Fischbacher et al. 2001). A small proportion of subjects did not fit into one of these
standard types and were classified as “Other” (see Table 4).
Figure 4 breaks down the sample by these conditional contribution types. In the full
sample, conditional contributors constitute 77% of the control treatment subjects, 66%
of the anger-induced subjects and 83% of the care-induced subjects. The difference
between the share of conditional contributors in the care and anger induction treatments
is significant in this sample (refer to Table 4 for a full set of pairwise comparisons of
types between treatments).
In the comprehension sample, conditional contributors constitute 70% of the control
treatment subjects, 71% of the anger-induced subjects and 79% of the care-induced
subjects. Furthermore, we find significant differences when the distribution over all
conditional contribution types is compared between the care and the control treatments.
These two distributions differ at p= 0.04 according to a Fisher’s exact test. Moreover,
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Fig. 4 Conditional contribution types across treatments
the joint distribution over all contribution types under the anger and control treatments
differs from the distribution under care at p= 0.06, suggesting that subjects under the
care treatment have a different set of objectives than those under control and to a lesser
extent, anger. These results highlight that preferences are different for subjects under
care in the comprehension sample, as the different contribution schedules cannot be
rationalized by similar preference orderings over outcomes of the game.
Result 3 Subjects’ elicited descriptive beliefs differ only slightly (and not signifi-
cantly) across induced motives in either the full or comprehension sample.
Figure 5 displays elicited beliefs about the contribution of subjects’ partners. Sub-
jects thought that others would contribute around e4.50–e6.00 on average. Refer to
Table 2 for averages by treatment. While beliefs are highest among care-induced sub-
jects and notably so in the comprehension sample, there are no statistically significant
pairwise differences in beliefs between treatments according to rank sum tests.
Result 4 Observed differences in beliefs do not fully mediate the observed differences
in contributions. In particular, for subjects under the care induction in the comprehen-
sion sample, contributions are significantly less explained through held beliefs than
for comprehensive subjects under the anger induction. This provides further evidence
that differences between treatments observed in the comprehension sample are driven
by preference shifts.
Table 5 provides evidence on whether elicited descriptive beliefs might mediate the
differences in contributions across treatments. In the first two columns, contributions
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Fig. 5 Beliefs
in the full and comprehension samples, respectively, are regressed on two indicator
variables for the anger induction and care induction treatments (the control treatment
is the base category). The estimated coefficients reproduce the mean differences noted
above. The difference between the coefficients on the care induction and anger induc-
tion dummies is significant at the p= 0.02 level for the comprehension sample. In the
next two columns, each subject’s elicited belief is added to the regressions of contri-
butions on treatment indicators, with interactions between beliefs and the treatment
indicators. Here (Eq. 4), we see that the difference in contributions between the care
induction and anger induction treatments is still significant at the p= 0.10 level. Fur-
thermore, the coefficients on the treatment indicators are not significantly different
in the regressions with and without beliefs. By these criteria, subjects’ beliefs do not
satisfy the requirements of a mediating variable (see e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2007).
This indicates that different motives are associated with different social preferences
and that behaviour under different motives is not merely driven by different beliefs
under these motives. Another interesting finding to come out of these regressions is
that comprehensive subjects under care are significantly less responsive to beliefs than
those under anger at the p= 0.01 level.
Online Appendix Table A.2 quantifies how much of the observed difference in con-
tributions between the care and anger treatments is attributable to differences in beliefs
by reporting two-way Oaxaca decompositions.15 This analysis suggests that e0.76 of
the e1.61 difference between the care induction and anger induction contributions
15 This method explains the difference in mean contributions between treatments by decomposing the
difference into (1) that part that is due to a combination of differences in average beliefs between treatments
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Table 5 Regressions of contributions by treatment, controlling for beliefs
Equation 1 2 3 4
Anger − 0.371 (.572) − 0.639 (.801) − 1.23 (1.08) − 1.63 (1.43)
Care − 0.185 (0.576) 0.967 (0.801) − 0.995 (0.993) 1.40 (1.50)
Belief 0.612*** (0.141) 0.769*** (0.182)
Belief × Anger 0.124 (0.182) 0.183 (0.206)
Belief × Care 0.129 (0.163) − 0.213 (0.213)
Constant 6.00 (0.438) 6.03 (0.638) 3.03 (0.838) 2.24 (1.27)
Full sample X X
Comprehension sample X X
N 184 96 184 96
R2 0.002 0.046 0.407 0.488
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***Indicates significance at the p= 0.01 level
is attributable to belief differences and e0.85 is the treatment effect after controlling
for beliefs. This remains significantly different from zero. We therefore conclude that
changes in beliefs are only partially responsible for the observed changes in contribu-
tions, and only for the care induction treatment. This corroborates evidence presented
above from the conditional contribution schedules.
Result 5 Different induced motives are associated with different patterns of atten-
tion. In particular, care-motivated subjects show less self-focus and anger-motivated
subjects show more other-focus. Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported by the data.
Figure 6 displays subjects’ attention to their own and other’s payoffs as displayed
on the example calculation screen. There are no significant differences in attention
between subjects in the full and comprehension samples. Across all treatments subjects
pay more attention to their own payoffs. Care-motivated subjects in the full sample
view their own payoff significantly less often than those in the control treatment (at
p= 0.089 according to a rank sum test). In the comprehension sample a similar pattern
emerges.
Subjects in the care induction focused less on their own payoffs (p< 0.1), while this
was not the case for subjects in the anger induction. Rather, for subjects in the anger
induction only, payoff differences in the example games predicted increased contribu-
tions, suggesting that angry participants might have based their contribution decisions
on payoff comparisons. This may be seen in Table 6. There is a significant positive cor-
relation between the difference between the subject’s own displayed example payoff
and the other’s displayed example payoff, and the subject’s subsequent contribution
for subjects in the anger induction treatment, but not in either the control or care
induction treatments. This means angry people who see their own payoff higher than
another’s give more while angry people with displayed payoffs lower than others give
Footnote 15 continued
and differences in the impact of beliefs on contributions in the different treatments and (2) the residual
difference. We interpret the residual difference as arising from preferences.
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Table 6 Correlations between displayed payoff examples and contributions
Control Anger induction Care induction
Full − 0.010 0.281** − 0.191
Sample p= .940 p= 0.027 p= 0.128
Comprehension − 0.155 0.331** − 0.065
Sample p= 0.412 p= 0.042 p= 0.741
less. The direction of the correlation under the care treatment is consistently opposed
to the direction under the anger treatment. Since anger-induced subjects are signifi-
cantly more affected by implied differences in payoffs, it makes some sense that they
would pay more attention to their partner’s payoffs.
Result 6 The motive of anger is associated with weakly greater competitive percep-
tions of game incentives. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported by the data.
Figure 7 displays the relative proportions of subjects in each treatment who state that
they think the public goods game to be more similar to a purely competitive (matching
pennies) rather than a purely cooperative (pure coordination) game. A large majority
of subjects in all treatments consider the public good game to be more cooperative
than competitive. The biggest majority is in the control treatment. A slightly higher
proportion of subjects in the care induction treatment consider the game to be more
competitive. Subjects in the anger induction treatment are the most likely to consider
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the game to be more competitive than cooperative. Indeed anger-induced subjects were
nearly twice as likely to consider the game to be more competitive than subjects in the
control treatment. Significant differences are detectable only between the control and
anger induction treatments for the full sample (at p= 0.02).
To disentangle the various channels through which the induced motive of care
increases contributions over the anger condition, taking into account our data on sub-
jects’ attention and game form perceptions, we estimate the structural model depicted
in Fig. 8. This model takes as exogenous the indicator variable care, which is equal to
1 for subjects in the care treatment and 0 for subjects in the anger treatment. Control
subjects are not considered in this model. The endogenous variable of ultimate interest
is the subject’s unconditional contribution, which we model as being determined by
their belief s and their preferences, as captured by the value of their conditional con-
tribution schedule evaluated at the mean of all contributions across treatments (Pred
c.c.). These variables in turn are modelled as depending on three endogenous attention
variables (own payoff views, other’s payoff views, and their ratio), as well as an indi-
cator for whether the subject perceived the public goods game as more competitive
than cooperative (Comp. percept.), and the exogenous care treatment indicator.
The estimated direct effects (coefficient estimates) from the structural system are
displayed in Online Appendix Table A.3. Care is found to lower competitive percep-
tions, and decrease attention paid to one’s own payoff, the other’s payoff, as well as
the ratio of own to other’s payoff views. These effects are generally larger in the com-
prehension sample, though imprecisely estimated. The next equation estimates the
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Fig. 8 Diagram of structural model paths
impact of attention and perception on preferences and beliefs, respectively. Compet-
itive perceptions decrease predicted conditional contributions, but oddly only in the
full sample. Competitive perceptions mostly seem to be negatively affecting beliefs
that others will contribute. Attention to one’s own payoff views is associated with
lower predicted conditional contributions and attention to the other player’s payoffs
is associated with higher predicted conditional contributions but neither is associated
with beliefs on the other hand. The care induction increases both beliefs and predicted
conditional contributions separately from its effect on attention and perception. Both
beliefs and predicted conditional contributions are associated with higher uncondi-
tional contributions.
Online Appendix Table A.4 summarizes the indirect effect that care has on beliefs
and preferences based on its effect on attention and perception. While these mediating
variables account for some of the effect that care has on beliefs, the estimated effect
of care on preferences through the channels of attention and perception is negligible.
These results suggest that while changes in attention and perception are interesting
correlates of the motivational and belief changes which take place under induced
emotions, there is little evidence that they drive them.
6 Concluding discussion
The aim of this paper is to assess experimentally the influence of psychological motives
on economic decisions in a public goods game. In the experiments described above, we
induce these motives through autobiographical recall. We present evidence showing
that (1) preferences, (2) beliefs and (3) perceptions and attention are affected by two
opposing motives, care and anger. These findings are strongest for subjects that show
full comprehension of the game’s incentive structure.
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We were able to causally investigate how care and anger motives changed social
preferences through observing a one-shot interaction, eliciting incentivized beliefs
about other’s contribution, eliciting conditional contribution schedules that control
for beliefs, and assessing subjects’ comprehension of the game’s incentives. The care
motive elicits higher contributions to the public good than the anger motive. This find-
ing is significant for subjects that understand the game’s incentives well. Moreover, for
these subjects, conditional contribution schedules under care are always significantly
higher on average compared to conditional contribution schedules under control and
anger. Subjects under the anger motive induction had the highest number of free-riders
among them.
While the care treatment increases beliefs slightly relative to control and anger, these
belief changes explain less than half of the observed difference in contributions in the
comprehension sample. Interestingly, while beliefs generally explain a considerable
amount of the variation in contributions, this effect is significantly less pronounced
under care compared to anger in the comprehension sample.
Furthermore, subjects motivated by anger perceive the game to be significantly
more competitive than cooperative at more than twice the frequency compared to
control. Subjects under anger are also most attentive towards hypothetical displayed
payoff differences. When example payoffs were displayed to subjects under anger
that resulted in greater disadvantageous inequality or less advantageous inequality,
they were less willing to contribute. This is consistent with other research indicating
that anger leads to increased sensitivity towards perceived injustice. In summary, our
findings suggest that different motives are associated with different social preferences
as well as different perceptual and attentional tendencies and that beliefs influence
choices under different motives differently.
The small effects observed for the two induced motivations when compared to the
control group separately are somewhat in line with activation theories and the existing
research on emotions (e.g., small to moderate effects are typical; Angie et al. 2011).
Moreover, compared to the real world, induced motives in the lab are weaker and
do not persist as long, which makes observing them vulnerable to specific design
choices. Nevertheless, we do find significant differences in the sample that allows for
the clearest inference due to their level of comprehension.
While anger motives clearly lead to perceptual and attentional differences, they
do not lead to unconditional contributions significantly different from those under
control. This might be rationalized through different perspectives. While it has been
found that angry people are less sensitive to risks (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001),
the average conditional contribution schedules between the two treatments show little
difference. Psychotherapists have found that some patients react to anger with denial
(Fitzgibbons 1986). If subjects decided to deny their anger after having recalled anger-
inducing events, we would not expect an angry behavioural tendency and hence no
difference to control. The decontextualized lab situation with monetary incentives is
likely to suggest to subjects a normatively appropriate response is that they neglect
their anger. Likewise, they could have recalled an episode that they had not thought
about for a long time and towards which their attitude might have changed. If they
decided that by today’s standards, the situation they recalled was not so bad after
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all or decided to forgive the culprit/source of their anger, we would also expect that
contributions do not differ from control.
Smith and Lazarus (1990) find that anger leads subjects to perceive a situation as
unjust. It was also argued that anger leads to a more selective perception towards a
more hostile one (Finucane 2011). We demonstrated that subjects under anger are more
focused towards payoff differences. Van Kleef et al. (2008) summarize in a literature
review that the anger motive leads subjects to pursue more competitive behaviour,
which potentially increases their focus on their own payoff relative to the other’s.
Likewise, while subjects under the care induction were supposed to write about
feelings of compassion and warmth for another person, we noticed reading subjects’
essays that some of them described situations where they just empathized with the
emotional state of another person without becoming active themselves. Some others
directly described situations of sadness and grief that also affected the subject. While
empathy is a necessary first step such that compassionate or caring goals and action
tendencies materialize, it crucially needs to be distinguished from care. Empathy
describes sharing the feelings of another person. Care on the other hand is conceptual-
ized as an interest in the wellbeing of the other and an active desire to promote it which
motivates prosocial action tendencies towards the other person (Klimecki and Singer
2012). Recollection essays that contained elements of empathy, sadness, grief or fear
might have led to empathic distress or sadness which is associated with self-protective
and avoidant choices (Batson et al. 1983). The moral licensing effect (Sachdeva et al.
2009) may also apply to our care treatment. To the extent that writing about helping
others and increasing others’ well-being leads subjects to feel a sense of relief about
contributing to the public good game at hand, subjects issue a license for free-riding to
themselves by recalling own prosocial behaviour. However, recent research has raised
questions about the existence of such a moral self-regulation effect (Blanken et al.
2014) or shown that it applies only to some types of subjects (Clot et al. 2016).
We find the strongest evidence for preference changes due to anger and care motives
for those subjects who have fully comprehended the incentives of the public goods
game. This stands in stark contrast to the arguments of, e.g., Dufwenberg et al. (2011)
or Fosgaard et al. (2014, 2017) who argue that public goods contributions vary with
frames only because the frames influence subject beliefs or misconceptions about the
payoff structure. However, our results indicate that motives do not affect compre-
hension and that mis-comprehension does not explain treatment differences. We also
cannot find significant differences in first-order beliefs between motive treatments.
This suggests that we are observing a change in objectives and not simply heuris-
tic decision-making. We therefore conclude that objectives themselves differ across
environments, and that this may explain differences in cooperation across contexts.
Future research should focus on how commonly studied frames influence behaviour
by accounting for the psychological affect and motivational state changes they entail.
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